

REVIEW

OF A

"LETTER FROM THE

RIGHT REV. JOHN H. HOPKINS, D. D. LL. D.

Bishop of Vermont,

ON THE

BIBLE VIEW OF SLAVERY,"

By a Vermonter.

[Leonard March]

BURLINGTON :

FREE PRESS PRINT.

1861.

1881-1882
RECEIVED
JAN 10 1882

REVIEW

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA.

OF A

LETTER FROM THE

RIGHT REV. JOHN H. HOPKINS, D. D. LL. D.

Bishop of Vermont,

ON THE

BIBLE VIEW OF SLAVERY,"

By a Vermonter.

Leonard Marsh

BURLINGTON :

FREE PRESS PRINT.

1861.

P R E F A C E .

On the 20th of December 1860, some gentlemen of New York City addressed a letter to "The Right Rev JOHN H. HOPKINS, D. D. LL. D., BISHOP of VERMONT," requesting him, in view of the disturbed condition of the country, arising, as they said, "from the persevering agitation of the question of Slavery," to favor them with his "opinions upon the Scriptural Authority for Slavery, and the constitutional position of the contending parties," hoping that good would come to many in the community from their being made known. On the 30th of January 1861, Bishop HOPKINS replied to their request in the letter which forms the subject of the following review. His letter was published in some of the New York City papers, and subsequently in pamphlet form. It was stated also that a Society entitled "The American Society for promoting National Unity" which was formed in New York a few months ago, with SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, of N. Y. for *President* ; JAMES T. SOUTTER, of N. Y. *Treasurer* ; and Messrs. HUBBARD WINSLOW and SETH BLISS, *Secretaries*, was preparing an edition of 20,000 copies of this letter, as its first issue in the promotion of the objects of the society.

The feeling of many in this vicinity of the residence and labors of Bishop HOPKINS for many years past, is, that the reputation of the people of Vermont required that this letter should have a more extended examination and exposure than the brief notices of it in some of the newspapers of the State could furnish. Hence the following "Review." The Reviewer has not thought it worth while to criticise the argument of the last part of the letter, in favor of the right of "Secession." That subject is now in the way of a very *practical* solution,—to which it may be left.

Burlington, Vt , May 1861.

R E V I E W

O F

BISHOP HOPKINS'

*
"BIBLE VIEW OF SLAVERY."

The Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont, it seems, was called upon some weeks since, by certain persons in New York, for his "opinion upon the Scriptural authority for Slavery"—a very harmless opinion, one would think from the reading of it. But that it is supposed by some to be capable of mischief is evident from the fact that twenty thousand copies of it have been, or are to be, published by a certain recent combination of unequivocal character in New York, known under the style and title of the "American Society for promoting National Unity," *alias* the Society for transforming the government of the United States from a government in order to Freedom, into a government in order to Slavery.

This letter of the Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont is, I understand, the first issue and assault upon Freedom, of this Union loving and Scripture reverencing Society. I should greatly admire at the Society's method of commencing an attempt which may prove to be one of considerable difficulty before it is finished, were it not that the most skilful generals sometimes begin a battle with the lightest kind of skirmishers, merely as a prelude to something efficient. If such examples were in the mind of the Society its judgment is not to be gainsayed.

Before considering the Bishop's opinions in detail, it is obvious to remark, that the question of the "Scriptural Authority for Slavery" is one *simply of interpretation*—a remark which is made that I may preclude the accusation of denying the authority of Scripture, (it being a

very common trick of some clerical polemics, when hard pressed, to cry "infidel") even if I should doubt the interpretation of it by the Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont.

Preliminary, also, are certain facts of History, not without important bearings upon interpretation of Scripture in regard to slavery, at least for Christians. These facts of history go to show that, from the time of the Apostles, there has been, in the hearts of christians, a feeling, ever becoming deeper, and spreading wider, that slavery is incompatible with the spirit and principles of christianity. True, the Bishop makes the audacious assertion, that "no scruple was entertained on the subject (of slavery) until the close of the last century, when the new light burst forth which now dazzles the eyes of so many worthy people." Others, of the same pro-slavery stripe with the Bishop, have *some scruples* at such *palpable* falsification of history, but with an instinctive hatred of this fact, falsify history equally, but more prudently, by asserting that the feeling is fallacious, and had its origin "far back, in subtle heresies of an early period of christianity."

The very early existence of this feeling after the Apostles—whose directions annihilate slavery in everything except the naked legal relation—is shown by documents of the very first century, which prove that it was the custom to redeem christian slaves at the expense of the church. From this time forward the evidence is abundant, that the church expended immense sums in redeeming its members from slavery, and in the purchase of captives taken in war, that they might not be sold into slavery. By the decrees of councils, even the ornaments and sacred utensils of the church might be used for these purposes. In most other respects the influence of the church was decidedly anti-slavery, by advising and encouraging manumission; by declaring the marriage of slaves sacred; by admitting slaves into the ministry and sacred offices of the church, whereupon they became, *ipso facto*, free; by offering the sanctuary of the churches to slaves who fled from harsh treatment; by the threat of ecclesiastical penalties to severe masters, and by taking emancipated slaves under its protection. True, the Bishops and Abbots and others continued for a long time to hold slaves, partly from a seeming necessity as society was then constituted, and partly, no doubt, from the all but universal inconsistency, more or less, of men's conduct with their principles.

That this inconsistency was felt, and that the christian heart acknowledged the incompatibility of slavery with Christianity, is admirably shown by the prevalent custom, during the middle ages, of manumission at death, (when most men begin to be honest) and sometimes before, "for the good of the soul" of the testator, or of the souls of his ancestors.

The following, which is a charter of manumission by a French Prince, may serve as a specimen.

"For the good of the soul of our father Loys (Louis) and of our own, and of the souls of all our predecessors; all the serfs which we call *hommes de corps*, (body servants) who are at Orleans and the villages adjacent, we absolve forever from all yoke of servitude, them, their sons, and their daughters, and we will that they be equally free as if they had never been serfs. Done at Paris, in the year of the Incarnation of our Lord, 1180." *Caëfiqué, Hist. Phil. Auguste, I. 230*

In 1315, the King of France declared by a proclamation, the natural right of all men to freedom, and offered conditional liberty to the serfs upon his own estates.

The following throws light in more directions than one:

"The Holy Fathers, Monks and Friars, had in their confessions (that is, of the laity,) and especially in their extreme and deadly sickness, convinced the laity how dangerous a practice it was for one Christian man to hold another in bondage; so that temporal men, by reason of that terror in their consciences, were glad to manumit all their villeins. But the said Holy Fathers, with the Abbots and Friars, did not in like sort by theirs; for they also had a scruple in conscience to impoverish and despoil the Church so much as to manumit such as were bond to their churches, or to the manors which the church had gotten; and so kept their villeins still." *Sir Thomas Smith, Commonwealth, B, iii. c. x.*

Enough has been said to show to what influence, working deep and wide in Christian hearts and communities from the time of the Apostles, (an influence which the Bishop says did not exist till the end of the last century, and then and since only as a "popular delusion,") is owing the great fact that, at the commencement of the Reformation, Slavery was all but extinct in every part of Europe. "It was," says Guizot, "by putting an end to the cruel institution of slavery, that Christianity extended its mild influence to the practice of war," (that is, by destroying the demand for captives).

"It is not," says Robertson, "the authority of any detached precept in the Gospel, but the spirit and genius of the Christian Religion, more

powerful than any particular command, which has abolished the practice of slavery throughout the world."

This, of course, is to be taken with some limitation in regard to Negro slavery—but how long is it since, if it was not wholly abolished, it was wholly condemned, in the conscience and intellect of every Christian man? In 1818, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, *North and South*, declared *unanimously*, that slavery is utterly inconsistent with Christianity, in language which the Bishop would pronounce slanderous and inflammatory. And at that period, and later, no slaveholder in the United States pretended that slavery was not a misfortune, a curse, and an immorality not to be defended, but only apologized for until it could be got rid of.

Now, what was, and is, in relation to Scripture interpretation, and "Scriptural authority for slavery," the *meaning* of this greatest, most undeniable, and most pregnant fact of modern history? An institution which was universal, which was, as it were, the ineradicable foundation of society, was inwrought into all its most intimate structure, was defended by some of the strongest interests and passions of human nature, has all but utterly perished and become extinct, because a still small voice, but ever audible and imperative in the human conscience, has firmly pronounced it, under all its protean forms, incompatible with Christianity—the Divine Leaven constantly refusing to assimilate it. What is the meaning, Bishop, in relation to "Scriptural authority for Slavery," of this unanimous utterance of the Church universal, in the midst of which is Christ?

Let us suppose an Ecumenical Council of the Church, consisting not only of Bishops and Clergy, but of every true member of the Church on earth, and let the question before the Council be: What is the true relation of Christianity to American Slavery *by the authority of Scripture?*—to American Slavery as a *permanent system, and perpetual relation of man to man?*—is this System in harmony with the spirit and aims of Christianity, by a true interpretation of Scripture? The NO! would be as when seven thunders uttered their voices. Will the Bishop deny that such would be the decision of the Council? Would he object to the presence of the laity, or to some others that he might reckon heretical? Let all retire except the Clergy and Bishops of his own Church, each of undoubted Apostolical succession—would the decision be different,

or more than slightly less unanimous? Nay, let the question be referred to the Episcopal Church of the United States alone, which has the most shamelessly pro-slavery clergy on the face of the earth, and the Noes would have it by an overwhelming majority.

Is it possible, now, to have, or to conceive of, a more authoritative interpretation of Scripture than by this method? Dare the Bishop, as a good Churchman, deny its authority? Will the Bishop refuse to hear the Church? Then I have the very highest warrant for saying that he is to be accounted of as “a heathen man and a publican.”

This method, then—giving, by the acknowledgment of all Christians, the highest and final decisions on Scripture interpretation—having placed the Bishop in a very lean minority, the question of “Scriptural authority for Slavery” might rest here for all Christians, for men “*calling themselves Christians*,” and specially for all Bishops.

Sophistry, however, for minds unaccustomed to logical thought, and especially sophistry skilfully addressed to ignorance *for the very purpose of deception*, cannot be counteracted by mere demonstration of the truth. There is thrown upon the defenders of truth the ignoble and nasty necessity of uncoiling all the snaky folds of the sophistry itself, so that it may be visible and palpable to all men. That these remarks are applicable to the character and *purpose* of the Bishop’s letter I mean to make undeniable before I have done with it. The time for *soft* words is past.

I assure the Bishop that it is with feelings of unaffected grief and humiliation, that I say this; and that there should be occasion, in a Christian community, and community of free men, to defend Christianity against the monstrous accusation, *by a Christian man*, that it approves and justifies, as a permanent system of relations of man to man, American Slavery. The wish rises incessantly to my lips: Oh, that an enemy had done this! some heathen, some infidel, or at least a Jew!

I shall dispose of the Bishop’s “array of positive proof” in as few words as possible. For I feel an irrepressible disgust at entering upon the exposure of misstatements, and specious and insidious, but false, arguments and assumptions, which have, every one, been refuted, over and over again, for the thousandth time, but brought out again (the trick of all demagogues) as if they were new, or at least unanswered, and unanswerable.

The first point made by the Bishop, is of course the prophecy of Noah. “Cursed be Canaan, a servant of servants shall he be to his

brethren. Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant."

The first thing the Bishop does here, is coolly to *assume* as true, that of the truth of which he not only offers no proof, but of the truth of which there exists no proof or probability whatever, viz., that the negroes are the posterity of Ham. The ablest interpreters, including those of the Jews, believe that the prophecy had its complete fulfilment in the conquest of Canaan by the Jews—an interpretation which lies upon the very face of the passage. Yet here is a whole race of mankind doomed to endless earthly malediction, and shut out from all the proper ends of humanity, *made a little higher than the brutes*, by quietly and insidiously taking for granted that which is utterly baseless and void of proof. The Bishop is a lawyer; suppose he had a case in court which involved the legal right to a great inheritance, would he expect to gain his client's cause by such proofs of descent as can be brought to show that the Negroes are the posterity of Ham? Let it be supposed that a man is to be rightfully adjudged to slavery upon legal proofs made that he is one of that unlucky family—is there a court, in christendom or out of christendom, that would entertain the question for a moment? What, then, is to be thought of the head and of the heart of the man, who, so far as in him lies, authorises and promotes the terrible practical and actual results of the conclusions which he draws from such premises. I wish the *Society for the propagation of Slavery*, joy of their champion.

The second thing which the Bishop does at this point, is to *assume* again that, whatever is foretold *thereby* becomes *right*, right not only in relation to God and His Providence, but right in the human agents by whom the prophecy is fulfilled. The divine right and justification of the slaveholder are established by the fact that slavery was foretold. The slaveholder *thereby* becomes God's faithful and obedient servant, entitled to the Divine approbation and reward. Some parts of Holy Scripture are evidently not aware of this Episcopal method of interpretation. They ought to be altered as follows: "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel of God, ye have with *holy* hands crucified and slain." "Blessed is the man whose sins are—*foretold*." "Verily I say unto you that one of you shall betray me. The Son of man goeth as it is written of him,

and *blessings* upon the man by whom the Son of man is betrayed ; it was good for that man *that he was born.*"

Now, here is a kind of logic from which these and many suchlike improved Scripture readings follow inevitably ; and from this same logic is concluded the rightfulness and Divine sanction of the most outrageous and shameless oppression and injustice—considering that it is Christian—which the world has ever beheld. A fact which shows to what incredible extent a predetermined conclusion may infatuate a man in his methods of arriving at it ; unless, indeed, we are compelled rather to infer (*so incredible is it that a sane mind should thus impose upon itself*) that, instead of an unconscious self-delusion, there is a conscious purpose to deceive others by reasoning known to be false. Let slavery still hold on to the curse of Canaan—nothing can more effectually demonstrate the utter poverty of its logical resources.

The second prop in the Bishop's argument could not be other than "Abraham the friend of God." Here again, at Abraham, the Bishop silently *assumes*, and I doubt not innocently this time, that whatever a good man does is, *ipso facto*, right, and of Divine right. Does not the Bishop perceive that, unless he *proves* this, instead of taking it for granted, his argument from the fact that Abraham was a slaveholder, is fatally vitiated, good for nothing, in fact, without this proof ? But is it so that all the actions of good men are good ? David was a man after God's own heart—what says the Bishop to some of David's actions ? Yet the example of Abraham never fails to be appealed to as the impregnable argument in defence of slavery.

But there is another trait in Abraham's character, and that of the other patriarchs, which troubles the slaveholders and especially the Bishops. They were polygamists. Now, the Bishop of Salt Lake (no offence, I use the word in its etymological sense) uses identically the same argument from the example of the patriarchs in defence of polygamy, as the Bishop of Vermont does in defence of slavery. The arguments are *perfectly parallel* in every point. No wit of man or skill of logic can detect any difference between them. Yet the Bishop of Vermont reckons the argument to be good in one case and good for nothing in the other. He of Salt Lake reckons it good in both cases. He is much the better reasoner. For there is no conceivable method by which those who take

the one can avoid the logical necessity of taking the other along with it. He who rejects the one, must by the same necessity reject the other also. Yet proslavery logic takes and rejects at pleasure, here and on other occasions, where there is not the slightest logical difference, and *calls it argument*.

The Bishop arrives, at length, in his "array of positive proof," at the laws of Moses, where his satisfaction would be unalloyed, were it not for the unlucky dilemma, worse than in the case of Abraham, out of which the squirmings of the most snaky sophistry can never deliver him. I do not know whether the Bishop is aware that, among all honest reasoners, an argument which proves too much is rejected as vicious and unreliable. One would suppose that he had never heard of this rule of logic from his own method of reasoning.

Here again, at Moses, the Bishop *assumes* (what will the Bishop's "Scriptural authority for slavery" rest on, when all his airy fabric of assumptions is taken away?) that certain municipal regulations, enacted for an ancient small tribe of men in peculiar circumstances, are enactments of perpetual obligation for all mankind. No, I wrong the Bishop. He is not so honest as that. He asserts this of such of these regulations as he likes, and denies the authority of the rest.

A rude and ignorant, and peculiarly obstinate tribe of men, was to be educated, and gradually elevated to a higher form of civilization than that of the nations around them. But that "which was perfect" could not be realized at once, for the same reason that St. Paul was obliged to feed the early Christians with milk and not with meat, because they were not able to bear it. A mild, carefully regulated, and as many able expositors think, *limited* slavery (for the question whether *all* slaves were set free at the Jubilee, is still in dispute) was *permitted* them, (for they were not, as the Bishop asserts, *commanded* to enslave their neighbors) but so, also, polygamy and divorce at will were permitted and regulated. These customs, universal at that period, and passionately adhered to by barbarous men—though evil in themselves—it was found necessary rather to regulate and restrain, than wholly to abrogate. But while the *rules* permitted them, *principles* were at the same time announced, which, in proportion as they wrought in the character of the nation, tended to their extinction. For the spirit of the teachings of the Old Testament alone makes it obvious that *all* these customs were permitted for the same reason that Christ has given in regard to *one* of them, viz., the hardness o

the Jewish heart. That there was felt to be some inherent injustice, in the slavery practiced towards the heathen, is plain from the fact that the Jews were not permitted to "oppress" their brethren with the same. But under Christ there is neither Jew nor Gentile, Greek nor Barbarian ; the wall of partition is taken away, and *all men* are brethren.

Certain things, also, were *prohibited* to the Jews, as usury, and certain others were enjoined and made imperative. Now, the Bishop's argument in defence of slavery here is incurably vicious, irretrievably defective, by proving too much. Here is a dilemma for the defenders of slavery by the authority of Moses, from which the most slimy and slippery logical eel can never get out. For if slavery is permitted to all Christians, because it was permitted to the Jews, then, inevitably, polygamy is permitted to all Christians for the same reason, so far as regards the authority of Moses. If the one is of universal validity by this authority, then so is the other. If, moreover, what was *permitted* to the Jews is *therefore* permitted to Christians, then what was *prohibited* to Jews, is prohibited to Christians and what was *commanded* to Jews, is also commanded to Christians. The slavery men must take all or nothing. There is no possible escape from this necessity, except *by the grossest violation of all the rules of honest reasoning*. This is so plain, that none but the most fool-hardy sophist would attempt to evade it, and none but the most impudent sophist would deny it. But the slaveholders, and especially the Bishops, eschew polygamy, and the prohibition of taking interest of their countrymen for money, and by so doing, cut themselves off from all Mosaic defence of slavery.

The Bishop asserts, however, that slavery is authorized by the Almighty in the last of the Ten Commandments. "There needs no laborious argument," to quote the indignant words of a distinguished English Jew, "to refute this *so audacious* representation," thrusting into the Ten Commandments the idea of property in man. Here is just another of the Bishop's gratuitous assumptions, namely, that wherever the English Bible uses the word *servant*, the original means *slave*. Whence it follows that all officers of the State are the State's slaves, that under a monarchy the officers of the government are the king's slaves, that all good men are God's slaves, that the Apostles were Christ's slaves, and that St. Paul and his fellow-laborers were slaves of the Corinthian Church. The purpose of the Tenth Commandment, and *its only purpose*, is to forbid covetousness, and it illustrates its meaning, among other ways, by allusion to a relation common and necessary always and everywhere, (and therefore

the application of the command to it is of universal validity) that is, the relation of *laborer and employer*. It forbids unjust and selfish interference with that arrangement (a prohibition, by the way, which both men and women, now and here, where there are no slaves, would do well to take heed of. The command, however, being not to covet *slaves* in the Bishop's opinion, he would, perhaps, justify the coveting and seducing away of *free* laborers, on the principle that whatever is not prohibited is among "reserved rights"). The commandment does not express, or imply any opinion in regard to the relations by which it is illustrated except that they were customary relations to be regulated by it, just as other relations both good and bad (as polygamy and divorce) were regulated by other laws of Moses. If therefore, it could be made certain that there is an allusion to slaves in the commandment it would not help the matter. That the regulation of a custom proves its rightfulness, *proves too much for the Bishop*. The prohibition, in its utmost extent, amounts to this, that men are not to be grasping and intermeddling in regard to the legal rights and property of others. But to conclude, *therefore*, that all legal property has been *justly* acquired is a feat that no logic except the Bishop's could accomplish. To prove besides, that the command : "Thou shalt not covet," authorizes slavery, which not only covets, but grasps, and appropriates by force, all that another has, and does, and is, both the man's property and himself—this feat even the Bishop's logic can never perform.

What honest argument, then, can be drawn from the Old Testament, in defence of Christian slavery ? None, none whatever.

The Bishop having established—as far as his kind of logic can prove anything—the "scriptural authority for slavery" out of the law of Moses, seems very desirous to have it understood, and uses some very characteristic arguments to make it appear, that this law was not abolished by the Christian dispensation. Heaven defend ! If this is so, what life-long guilt lies upon the soul of the uncircumcised Bishop ! and what hecatombs of trespass-offerings are due from all of us ! As the question is not of the slightest consequence in the discussion of christian slavery, I allude to it only as another specimen of the Bishop's mode of reasoning. The Bishop, however, evidently thinks otherwise—it being important, it would seem, in his estimation, to confirm the authority of Moses in regard to slavery by the authority of St. Paul. He risks the assertion (which after some search I find no adjective fitly to

characterise) that the law of Moses was not abolished by Christianity, in order to conclude that slavery was not abolished by Christianity. And after quoting St. Paul profusely on the subject, says "the evidence of the New Testament is thus complete, plainly proving that the institution of slavery was not abolished by the Gospel." He informs us, also, that "Christ lived in the midst of slavery maintained over the old heathen races in accordance with the Mosaic law," thus implying that the slavery spoken of in the New Testament, was a continuation of the Mosaic slavery. In the opinion of all competent scholars, however, Mosaic slavery had become wholly extinct before the time of Christ; and certainly the language of St. Paul has no relation whatever to Jewish slavery. This is a fact of of some consequence, as we shall see bye and bye.

The Bishop's defence of slavery from the New Testament is plausible, and skilfully put, and doubtless, in his opinion, the New Testament gives undeniable authority for slavery as a permanent Christian institution. But if this is really so, how is to be explained the fact, already mentioned, of undeniable doubts and uneasiness of conscience in Christian men in regard to slavery, increasing from the Apostles down, until the Church universal decided that the Bishop's interpretation is incorrect?

Let us see if this remarkable fact can be explained without accusing all christendom of being persistently contaminated with a "subtle heresy originating far back in an early period of Christianity"; or of being under the influence of "popular delusion" and "false philanthropy." If, on the contrary, it should appear, that, instead of a subtle heresy in all christian minds, there is a subtle sophism in the pro-slavery argument from the New Testament, as there is a most gross one in that from the Old Testament, then, it may be that the Bishop will admit the offence of christendom, in thinking differently from himself, to be more than "paliated," perhaps he will condescend to "excuse" it.

First, it is necessary to repeat what has been a thousand times said and shown, (but what men who adhere obstinately to the letter, like the Bishop, never comprehend,) that Christianity is not a set of rules in detail, like the laws of Moses, but a system of great principles, working as a Divine leaven in the heart and conscience of men and nations, most often silently and slowly, to mould men and states, in all their relations, to forms consistent with its own spirit and purposes.

Second, this is the *only appropriate* method of Christianity. It never, if true to itself, interferes *directly* with the State. Christ always

refused to be made king, or to meddle with matters in *legal* dispute. He said he came not to *enact*, but to “*preach* deliverance to the captives.” Yet, notwithstanding this constant refusal of Christianity to interfere with Cæsar, its hope, its legitimate aim, and its effect is to alter, amend, originate, or abolish, more or less, all the laws and relations of society.

Third—neither Christ nor St. Paul had anything to do with the Mosaic State as such. It had ceased to exist. But in regard to Mosaic rules which the Jews still observed, Christ expressly condemns what was “said by them of old time,” and St. Paul zealously combats the Christians “zealous for the law,” and all but ridicules such judaizing teachers as the Bishop. He confirmed no Mosaic slavery “not abolished by the Gospel.” He had nothing to do with Jewish slavery, but with Roman slavery, a slavery a thousand times worse than the Jewish, (the worst the world has ever seen except the American) and thoroughly mingled into all the legal relations of the Empire. But Roman law was not to be evaded or *seceded* from.

Now, did the method, the purpose, or the interests of Christianity require, or permit the Apostle to assume the functions of the magistrate, and interfere directly with the laws of the State? What, then, should he have done other than he did do, (as true Christianity has always done with all legal wrongs)—prescribe the spirit of Christianity to control, among Christians, the relations of master and slave, and so eliminate from it the injustice which constituted, and always constitutes, its *malum in se*; thus leaving nothing of slavery but the empty name and legal form. For the *malum in se* of slavery consists not in these, but in its *animus* and essential purpose. This purpose, the very life, and only vital principle of the thing, is to make the slave the mere instrument, *tool*, of the master—an instrument *exclusively* for the ends of the master, the slave having no legal claim or right whatever in relation to the ends for which he is used. He is a thing, a chattel to all intents and purposes whatsoever. This is the very definition which slavery, both Roman and American, gives *of itself*. All ends proper to man, as man,—implied in his prescribed relations to God, and therefore of divine right in the highest sense—these ends of an intellectual, moral, spiritual, immortal being, must give place, and do give place, to—“*the profit of the master*.” This is to trample upon the image of God. This is *essential injustice*. But, plainly, before slavery can be consistent with Christianity, its injustice, and *all* its injustice must be excluded. The *least* injustice inherent in the

system would vitiate it fatally. Now here is the point. **THIS SLAVERY** *would cease to be "profitable to the master."* It has no principle of permanence. It would forthwith die of inanition. A *system* of slavery based upon mutual and equal duties of master and slave, upon mutual and equal benefits, never did, and never will exist. Individual examples of a relation approaching this, and still not ceasing to be *legally* slavery may sometimes be found in slaveholding communities, partly from the necessity of domestic service not otherwise there to be procured, and sometimes from a sense of duty to slaves forbidden by slave law to be emancipated, or not yet fitted for freedom. But the moment the *system* requires, by an imperative and efficient law, the realization of such a relation, *ipso facto*, it perishes. *Now this is just the relation which St. Paul's slavery prescribes.* For let us see how much of real slavery was left by the language of St. Paul himself.

It is to be remembered that all the *general* exhortations of the Apostle are addressed to freemen and slaves indifferently, the first churches consisting in large proportion of slaves.

"Fornication, and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not be once named among you, as becometh saints."

"For this is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication "

"To avoid fornication, *let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband*

"Flee fornication—What ! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost ?"

Are southern slaves permitted to obey these precepts? and if not, is it not because it would diminish the "profit of the masters?"

The Apostle also constantly insists upon the acquisition of *knowledge* as one of the duties of Christians. He prays that they may increase in knowledge; that they may be filled with knowledge; that they may abound more and more in knowledge. He thanks God for their knowledge. He commends them for their knowledge, and where he finds them ignorant, whether in regard to spiritual or other matters, he says he speaks it to their shame. And such is the spirit and aim of Christianity throughout. Its purpose is to redeem and restore man in all his powers of body and mind; to deliver him, not only from sin, but from ignorance and consequent degradation, that, being "created a little lower than the angels," he may offer to God, not a stupid and brutish service, but the intelligent worship of one made in His own image. For the Christian man, says the Apostle, "is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him." But that slaves should realize these ends

of Christianity, is not *for the interest of the masters*. A system based upon the slavery of such men, or of those permitted the mere attempt to become such, could not exist.

That the Apostle did not intend his general exhortations exclusively for free men, (with another gospel for slaves, as they have at the South,) is evident from such language as the following. Among renewed men, Christians, “there is neither Greek nor Jew. circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, *bond nor free* ; but Christ is all in all.”

“By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether *bond* or free.”

The relations of slavery, as between master and slave, were of two kinds—where both master and slave were Christians, and where only one or the other were Christians. In the first case, the master was to treat the slave with kindness, justice and equity ; and the slave was to be honest and faithful in his service. The slave was not to fail of due respect to his master, because he had been elevated to be his master’s brother ; and the master was to consider the slave no longer “*as a slave, but above a slave, a brother beloved*.” Here in the famous Epistle to Philemon, (which I think all men will in due time be ashamed to quote, or to have quoted, in defence of slavery) is the key to the whole relation, as between Christians. The Apostle’s rules are few and brief, but sufficient to change the relation of master and slave into that of guardian and ward, or one where mutual and equal duties and benefits were given and received, while the name and legal *status* remained as before.

In the case where Christian masters had unconverted slaves, they were of course to be treated with the same justice as Christian slaves. And in all cases, as St. Paul’s language every where implies, slaves were to be entitled to all the privileges, and the means of obeying all the commands and exhortations, of Christianity.

In the case where Christian slaves had unbelieving masters, a more severe duty was prescribed to them. They were to honor their masters, and be obedient even to those who treated them unjustly. The doctrine of God must not be subjected to reproach among the unbelievers by their disobedience to the laws. Nor the interest of Christianity brought into danger, through them, by the accusation, that it was hostile to the State. They might well be content to *suffer wrong* for Christ’s sake. (And here comes in an every day specimen of characteristic Episcopal and other pro-slavery logic—that, because it may be right, and sometimes a duty,

for the slave to suffer wrong, therefore, it is right for slavery to inflict it.) They could console themselves with the thought that they were Christ's *freedmen*, and remain with patience in their condition rather than dishonor Him.

If, however, they had power to be free, they were to make use of it; for they were Christ's servants, he had bought them; they were not to be the slaves of men—that is, if it could be properly avoided. If it could not, they were not to be in distress on that account.

Thus, evidently, in the opinion of St. Paul, freedom is the proper condition for man; though slavery may be one of the forms of self-denial to which it may be his duty, sometimes, to submit. Let it be remembered that these opinions and exhortations were not addressed to men who were citizens of a Christian State, much less to Christian rulers and legislators, but to the subjects of the most irresistible and cruel despotism which the world has ever seen. If it had been his business to prescribe the duties of the Roman government, he might, perhaps, have given directions which would have rendered some of those he did give unnecessary. St. Paul, then, treated slavery as a legal wrong which he had no legal power to redress; he therefore, according to the constant method of Christianity, without interfering with the State, subjected it to such moral influences as, for all Christians, tended to destroy it by making it no longer profitable to the master.

Let us now look for a moment at the actual system of American slavery, and see if, *in that which is essential to its permanent existence*, there is any injustice, anything which hinders the purposes of Christianity, or disregards the exhortations of St. Paul, any blemish, which could offend the fastidious moral sense of the Apostle. All laws for regulating the relations of man to man are (if of divine right, for injustice can never be of divine right,) in order to justice. What, then, are the laws of the American slave system?

1st.—*The child of the slave follows the condition of the mother.* This happens though the father may have been white for so many generations, that the child is as white as the father. The Bishop knows that such cases are not rare at the South. Are these white slaves the children of Ham, and so rightfully slaves by the curse of Canaan? This law, however, is a necessity of slavery, for if the child followed the condition of the father, not only would the profits of the master be greatly diminished, but how long could the system itself exist?

2nd.—What is the legal condition of the children of these slave mothers? The law of South Carolina defines it for all the States, as follows. “Slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, reputed and adjudged in law, to be *chattels personal* in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators and assignees, to all *intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever.*”

This law needs no comment except to say that it is in full practical operation to all intents and purposes. It gives the master every kind and degree of power over the slave which he has over his other domestic animals, only he must not kill him, at least not in the presence of a white man—except as the law most naively remarks, when “*he dies under moderate correction.*” But this law is indispensable to the *profit of the master.*

3rd.—“A slave can make no contract,” *not even a contract of marriage.* He is never married. He has no marital rights or responsibilities. His children are propagated in the same way, and for the same reason, as the progeny of his fellow animals, that is, for market, and the *profit of his master.* How, then, are the commands, and exhortations of the Apostle in regard to chastity, and all family relations, to be obeyed? And this is not the case of Christian slaves exhorted to be patient under heathen masters, but the way in which *Christian masters* treat their fellow-Christians, their “brethren beloved”—and, *proh scelus*, they quote the *Epistle to Philemon in justification of it!* But this is also necessary to the *profit of the masters.*

4th.—*All learning is by law forbidden to the slave.* He is made or kept brutish, and then accused of being only an animal. Are such prohibitions ever thought necessary for the restraint of other animals? Every *human* faculty or aspiration is repressed, the intellect made to remain latent, eradicated, in fact, as far as possible, (“howbeit in understanding be men,” says the Apostle) because MEN (“in understanding”) would be a very uncertain and unsafe investment of property, dangerous “chattels.” The master could not rely upon his profit, or be sure of his safety. This law, therefore, is necessary in order to these ends of the master.

5th.—*A slave cannot be a witness against a white person.* He may be subjected to any abuse, or even be murdered in the presence of other slaves—so he may in the presence of white men by *moderate correction*, or at any time on the least show of resistance. The absence of this law would lead to great inconvenience, and much diminish the profit of the master.

These, and many other such like laws, place the slave under the absolute dominion of the master, body and soul, and are necessary, indispensable, in order to the legitimate and essential end of slavery, which, says a distinguished Judge of North Carolina, "has nothing in common with the relation of parent and child, master and apprentice," (as the Bishop and sundry other D. Ds. would have us believe;) there is an impassable gulf between them. In the one case the end in view, is the happiness of the youth. *The end of slavery is the profit of the master, his security, and the public safety.* That is, the safety of the slaveholders.

Here, then, we have, in part, the American system of slavery, as by law defined and established. Under which there are, at present, four millions of human beings, *men* reduced to *things*, to chattels personal, to all intents and purposes whatsoever. And this subjection gives the master power, not only over the body of the slave, but over his soul, and every human faculty, and capability, and relation; or what would be human relations if the slave were permitted to have any. And this is not a mere nominal power suspended over the slave, but one—with few exceptions—ever in active exercise to the fullest extent.

The Bishop, however,—notwithstanding this, one would think, sufficiently plain language of the laws, and the recent pretension of Southern Senators in Congress, that the Constitution of the United States makes slaves *property to all intents and purposes* in all the States of the Union,—the Bishop, I say, cannot understand what it is *in the principle of "property in man"* which "disgusts" people; and makes the assertion beyond which even *effrontery* could not go, that "*no slaveholder pretends that this property extends any further than the right to the labor of the slave.*" Let all men mark this assertion as a characteristic specimen of the true ophidian logic. Yes, a few slaveholders within the last year or two, beginning to feel the necessity of escaping from the "disgust" and indignation of mankind at their claim and laws of property in man, have be-thought themselves of this shallow lie, which the Bishop has unjustly fathered upon all of them.

"But, to have a property in human labor," the Bishop goes on to say, "under some form, is an essential element in all the work of civilized society." True, for once—all men who in any way employ others, have "a property in human labor"—*on condition of paying for it.* But what property have these employers in these *laborers*, beyond a claim to the labor they have purchased? Can these employers, *moreover*, for their profit, control all the physical, social, intellectual, civil, moral, spir

itual relations of the laborers? Now, what is the purpose of property except by the requisite use of it (which may be a disuse) to secure the profit, pleasure, safety of the owner? Does the slaveowner, then, having possessed himself of the muscular labor of the slave, (which is the only *labor* he is capable of) cease to exercise any further control over him for any of the ends of property? Not in the least—the *Bishop knows he does not*. The *non-use* of the brains of the slave is as necessary to the ends of property in him as the *use* of his muscles. That which he is forbidden to do, is as necessary to be *not done*, as that which he is required to do is to be done. All the legal deprivations of the slave increase his value,—this is the very purpose of them—though they do not increase the quantity of labor he can perform. Has the owner no *property* in handsome female quadroons when he *keeps* them, or adorns them for market, *for other purposes than labor*?

The Bishop says, with admirable coolness: “it is obvious that slavery cannot bind the intellect or the soul!” Yet one of the most accursed qualities of slavery manifests itself in forbidding all cultivation of the intellect of the slave, which is the *condition* of its freedom; and a special aim of the slave system is to keep the slave’s soul in the lowest, most degraded, and helpless form of slavery, knowing very well that free souls make free bodies. Even the religion of the slave is made subservient to the profit of the master, being often the grossest travestie of the gospel, as might be abundantly shown by South Carolina’s Episcopal catechisms, and other sophisticated teachings, intended to enslave his *very spirit* to submission, through fear that God is altogether such an one as his owner.

Thus it is obvious to the slightest reflection upon the slave system that its purpose is to enslave both body and soul, and that the property-interest of the master extends not only to “the right to the labor of the slave,” but to every power of body and mind, to every faculty and relation of the man. If this is not to have property in man, it is simply because slavery places him in the category of animals. Let the slaveholders adopt this honest method of escape from the accusation, instead of the lying pretension the Bishop has set up for them.

The following from a distinguished Southern writer, De Bow, is too characteristic to be omitted. Besides its blasphemy it has the true pro-slavery unction. It expresses, too, so exactly the Bishop’s principles, that I wonder he did not quote it himself:

“The Almighty has thought well to place certain of His creatures in certain *fixed positions* in this world of ours, for what cause He has not seen fit to make quite clear to our limited capacities; and why an ass is not a man, and a man is not an ass, will probably forever remain a mystery. God made the world; God gave thee thy place, my hirsute brother, and, according to all earthly possibilities and probabilities, it is thy destiny there to remain, bray as thou wilt. From the same great power have our sable friends, Messrs. Sambo, Cuffee & Co., received their position also.

* * * Alas! my poor black brother, *thou, like thy hirsute friend, must do thy braying in vain*’ That shall be as God pleases, Mr. De Bow, with permission, of course, of *South Carolina*.

Here, then, we have American slavery—four millions of men declared to be chattels personal, reduced to the condition and relations of domestic animals (practically) in every particular. And this is not a mere legal association, but as far as the system can accomplish it, the slave becomes a mere *human animal*. And, in order to the well rounded and beautiful consistency of the system, these human animals, like other domestic creatures, are propagated for sale; Virginia alone furnishing for market, of this brothel-produce, not less than ten millions of dollars worth annually.

This now, has a bad look. The dislocation between Christian premises and such practical conclusions, shocks most minds and hearts. Slaveholders themselves, some of them, more logical if not more sensitive than the Bishop, start back at such a yawning *non sequitur*. The more progressive of them, therefore, (just as twenty years ago the progressives of that period began timidly to assert that slavery is not inconsistent with the Christian religion) being hard pressed by this inconsistency, propose a shorthand method of avoiding it by doing away with the “popular delusion” that the negro is a *black MAN*, while in fact he is only a *black animal*. This is to be the next step in the physiological and moral development of slavery. It is being rapidly driven to this in self-defence. The adoption of this, as its fundamental dogma, will give an admirable consistency to the system, furnish a complete logical base for its present practices, and fill up the measure of its iniquity.

Here, then, at length, I hope the blindest are ready to see what I inadvertently called a *subtle* sophism in the pro-slavery argument from the New Testament—though a grosser one can hardly be imagined; *always excepting the Bishop’s argument from Ham*. It is this. St. Paul

having to do with a most unjust and oppressive slavery under a jealous heathen government, did not directly make war upon it, but quietly prescribed, for Christians, such rules in regard to it as deprived it of its essential principle of life and permanence, and left it to its fate: *therefore*, says the pro-slavery argument, American slavery, with all its accursed principles and practices, is ordained of Christ, and sanctioned by christianity, to be, of divine right, a permanent institution among men.

Now, is it strange, or difficult to explain, that, when the truly Christian man, though of the humblest intellect, sees clearly, as all such men do see, the inherent and essential injustice of slavery, and especially of American slavery, he should instinctively feel, if he does not see, the sophistry of defending it by the doctrines of Christ and the authority of St. Paul? The Bishop will find, I think, in due time, that, it is not by the influence of "popular delusion" and "false philanthropy" that the church universal has condemned slavery; and that not for such reasons is it that all christendom contemplates American slavery, and its defenders by "scriptural authority," with shame and indignation.

For all Christian hearts, or thinking minds, the Bishop's "Bible view of Slavery" might very well be dismissed here. But some of his answers to objections are such logical curiosities, that it may be worth while, by way of amusement, to look at a few of them.

The first is a most Quixotic tilt against what the Bishop evidently considers the great wind-mill of the age: the Declaration of Independence. Here are six mortal columns in fine print, of what it would be unjust to school boys to call school-boy declamation. One knows not whether to laugh at the ludicrous confusion of thought, and the ignorance of the Bishop—if ignorance is the true explanation—or, (if it is not,) to be indignant at the low pandering to the ignorance of others, in a style which none but the most vulgar demagogues ever make use of. Here are two alternatives by which to account for this extraordinary episode in the Bishop's Letter; which is to be taken, I shall leave the reader to decide for himself.

The Declaration of Independence,—(I beg pardon of the reader for the truisms about to be uttered in this paragraph. They are for the special benefit of the Bishop on the charitable hypothesis—which, however, I fear may be incorrect—of his ignorance of the meaning of the Declaration of Independence)—the Declaration sets forth certain great

fundamental truths which ought to lie as organic principles at the basis of every human State. First: "All men are created *equal*." That is, a State should not, and a just State will not, make men *unequal before the law*. A State should not bestow legal privileges and immunities upon some of its citizens which it denies to others. *All men* should have *equal right* to whatever they may lawfully acquire, however unequal their acquisitions, or their capacities for making them. Whatever good the State is in order to for any of its citizens, that should be open to the fair and impartial competition of all. Second: "*All men* are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." That is, rights of which they *ought not* to be *forcibly*, or otherwise *unjustly* deprived. "Among these are life,"—that men ought not to be wantonly (as by "moderate correction!") deprived of life, or without due form of just law, is to most minds, a self-evident truth—"Liberty,"—that slavery is contrary to natural right, and is based upon mere force and inherent injustice *was* the voice of all antiquity, *is* of all christendom, and of every unsophisticated human soul,"—"And the pursuit of happiness,"—men ought not to be interfered with in their choice and aims in life, except so far as the law of equal rights to all requires it.

Now the Bishop utterly confuses and confounds these general *principles*, which the Declaration says should preside over the organization of States, with *actual facts* which exist in contravention of them; or—more incredible still—with the physical, mental, and other natural and hereditary differences of men. So again, "*inalienable rights*" he really supposes to mean, or else———, rights of which it is *physically impossible* to deprive men.

No man ought to believe what is here stated of the Bishop without the evidence of more than one witness. I am, therefore, obliged to quote his very words. Speaking of what the Declaration calls "self-evident truths," he says: "But with due respect to the celebrated names appended to this document, I have never been able to comprehend that they are "truths" at all. In what respect are men "created equal," when every thoughtful person must be sensible that they are brought into the world with all imaginable difference in body, mind, and in every characteristic of their social position?" Again he says—"If it be said, however, that the equality and inalienable rights of all men, so strongly asserted, are only to be taken in a *political* sense (he concedes "that this *may be* the proper interpretation!") I cannot see how it removes the dif-

ficulty.—Because it is perfectly obvious that, since the beginning of human government, men have been created with all imaginable inequality, under slavery, under despotism, under aristocracy, under limited monarchy, under every imaginable form of political strife and political oppression."

Again, behold what marvellous inability the Bishop labors under. "Neither am I able to admit that all men are endowed with the *inalienable* right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Life is alienated, not only by the sentence of the law, but by innumerable forms of violence and accident! (think of that, believers in the inalienable rights of man!) Liberty is alienated, not only by imprisonment, but by irresistible restraints of social bondage, &c., * * * * so that there is hardly an individual to be found who has really the liberty of word and action so confidently asserted as the inalienable *right* of all men. As regards the "pursuit of happiness," alas! what multitudes alienate their right to it," &c.

The Bishop also confounds the civil relations of man to each other with their relations to God, and piously informs us that all human rights are forfeited by *sin*! and that, "mankind have no *rights* to claim at the hand of the Creator!" Hence,—oh! admirable, and for the Bishop, characteristic logic!—it follows that they have no rights to claim at the hands of their fellow-man. I commend this logic, not only to slaveholders, but to lawyers with bad cases. Let them plead that the other party has long ago forfeited his rights in the premises unless he can satisfy the court that he is not a sinner.

Moreover the Bishop informs us that inequality extends throughout the universe. There are inequalities and diversities in the mineral kingdom—in the vegetable kingdom—in the animal kingdom—in the races of men—in forms of government—one star differeth from another—there are Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers in the Heavenly Places!!

Now, from these magniloquent premises what follows? Why, that, your right to your dinner is not *equal* to my right to mine, because you cannot eat as much—that John's rights as a man are not equal to those of Thomas, because he is not as large—that Jones has not the same right to his property that Jenkins has to his, because there is not so much of it—the boy George has not the same right to make the most of his talents as Henry, because their talents are unequal—the rights of two young men

to aspire to positions, honors, duties, are not equal, because the heights to which they can respectively attain, are unequal—if God has distributed his gifts and endowments unequally to men then their respective rights to such as he has given them are unequal—and in general, if the things in which the rights are invested are unequal, then the rights themselves are unequal, and men are unequal in their rights. These are admirable conclusions from the premises, and so plain that they need no comment.

But the Bishop is quite sure there can be no *political* equality, because, he says, this means, if it means anything, that every man has the same right to political office and honor, that is, (as he evidently means) to the *same* office and honor. The Bishop's confusion of ideas is plainly ineradicable! Does an equal right to property mean a right to equal property? If not, then why should equal right to office mean a right to equal office? Every man has a right to the property he has lawfully and justly acquired; and so every man has a right to the office he has qualified himself for, and lawfully obtained. Properties are unequal, offices are unequal, rights are *not* therefore unequal.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I wish to ask the Bishop a *plain* question or two,—and if they are not *respectful*, it is not my fault—namely, whether he does, or did, when he wrote the “Bible view of Slavery,” *really believe* that the authors of the Declaration of Independence intended to assert that “all men are created equal” in respect to size, color, race, health, talents, social position, and so as to exclude all other imaginable natural differences? Or, did they, in his opinion, intend to assert that men are created equal in respect to their *actual* political relations, so that if some men are slaves all are slaves, if some are free all are free, if some have certain political rights or privileges or immunities all have the same, if some are under a particular form of government, all are under that form? Or, when they said that men are endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, &c.,—did they intend to assert that men *cannot* by force or accident be deprived of life—that it is physically impossible to divest men of liberty, by imprisonment or slavery—and that men never fail in the pursuit of happiness? Did the Bishop really believe that the authors of the Declaration intended to make these assertions? Or if he did not—and he did not—was it *honest*—or was it to play demagogue—to imply, and take for granted, that they so intended, and to base his criticism and argument

upon such false assumption? The Bishop can answer, or, if he declines, others can answer these questions without difficulty.

The Bishop is extremely desirous to protect the negroes against the consequences of the Declaration of Independence. It cannot be done, however. The Bishop's eloquent and pathetic appeal to the consistency of the slaveholding authors of the Declaration, and of the Constitution will not help him; and the argument from the "*true intent*" fights on the other side. It is *demonstrable*, from contemporary history, that those men *meant* exactly what they said—when they said "all men," they meant all men, negroes not excepted. It is certain from all the documents of the period, that they considered slavery a relic of barbarism which public opinion and their legislation would speedily exterminate. They treated it precisely as St. Paul did—they scotched it, and left it to die.

Neither will the Bishop ever succeed in proving that the Declaration "forms no part of our present system." Its principles are the corner stone of the Constitution, which also everywhere handles slavery with hot tongs, ashamed to touch, or even to name it. And if the full authority of the Constitution had been exercised, slavery could never have gone beyond the "Old Thirteen."

The Bishop is much exercised at the pestiferous moral influence of the Declaration in stimulating men to better their condition—making them discontented with their lot, &c.,—the homily is not worth criticising. The Bishop's ideal of a State is evidently the *Institutes of Menu*—the priests and warriors the dominant classes—all else slaves, and every man restricted hereditarily forever to the trade, or occupation of his father.

The Bishop objects strongly to the objection that slavery leads to immorality. So then some five hundred thousand brothels established by the laws of the Southern States, and sanctioned by the laws of the Southern Church, and one-half of the slaves the immediate children or inheriting the blood of their masters, is not, in the Bishop's opinion, inconsistent with Christian morality!

The Bishop dares to justify the sale of wives (as he calls them) and children by the analogy of the temporary separation of families among freemen, when necessity or duty requires it. I shall not, on this point, trust my feelings to express themselves in words.

The Bishop puts forth his best efforts to get rid of the objection from polygamy, and uses his accustomed means—misstatement of facts,

and false conclusions. Christ being appealed to by the Jews in regard to divorce, informs them that divorce was only *permitted* for the hardness of their hearts. Hence the Bishop infers that polygamy was *permitted* for the same reason. Very good—but why may not another man infer that slavery also (which includes both divorce and polygamy, so far as it permits anything like marriage) was *permitted* for the same reason? Because, says the Bishop, in regard to slavery, there is “an authoritative decree of the Almighty.” “In regard to the slavery of Ham’s posterity, He issues His commands distinctly.” *Now there is not anywhere in the Bible any command to enslave anybody.* Professor Stuart, one of the best Hebrew scholars in the country, in a pamphlet strongly apologetic of slavery, in which he brings every thing in *extenuation* of it that he could find, (though he did not attempt to defend it) after quoting the passage in Leviticus which is the Bishop’s great authority, says: “What now have we here? simply and plainly an unlimited liberty to purchase bondmen and bondmaids. But when Moses says ‘ye *shall* buy bondmen and bondmaids,’ he is not to be understood as giving *command* but *permission*. Our translators have here made the future tense *imperative*, and, as it were, *jussive*; but every one acquainted with Hebrew, knows that the future tense is very often *permissive*, that is, *it is used as a subjunctive mode.*” Thus it appears that slavery is in the same category with divorce and polygamy. But it is quite consistent with pro-slavery logic and morality, to discard two of the trio, and approve the third, though a thousand times the worst of the three.

The Bishop winds up his defence of slavery most appropriately, by endorsing the blasphemous pretension of Southern politicians, that slavery is a great missionary system—superior a thousand fold, says the Bishop, to the common method! Let us do evil that good may come! “The sure mercies of slavery” and the whip!! This is the machinery which a Christian Bishop thinks it well to substitute for the command of Christ and the practice of the Apostles!

The Bishop has evidently fallen in love with the slaveholding character. It is, certainly, of admirable unity and consistency. Such as it is in relation to its slaves, such it is in all relations. It feels, there, none of the restraints and limitations which in others, control equal and just relations. It has no bargains to make, no contracts to fulfill, no debts to pay. It *steals* what labor it needs. It gives, it withholds, it takes away, at pleasure. Its will is law. It is master. It dictates;

and its means are fear and force. These traits and methods never forsake it. In private intercourse with equals, it still domineers with bowie-knife and revolver. As legislator it repudiates its honest debts. It steals by law fortresses, arsenals, mints, and whatever else it has power to seize upon. As a treaty making power, it says: "it *does not* 'take two to make a bargain,' or to break it, when I am one of the parties." In argument the conclusions shall be such as *its* interests require, not such as the premises demand. In religion the interpretations of the Church Universal are rejected with the characteristic answer: "I am the Church." It says to the Author of Christianity: your command to *go* into all the world and preach the gospel, is obsolete. It is better, more profitable, to *send for* the heathen and make them *work* out their salvation.

Slavery, so lately humble, abject, making full confession of felony, asking only leave to repent and die, suddenly conceived hope of reprieve, and became self-apologetic, then hope of pardon and became self-justifying, next asserted that it had never been guilty, and by the most audacious and impudent sophistry, thought to establish its innocence. But its strength is puny in logical combats, and finding itself in danger of shameful defeat by this method, it has boldly, in desperation, seized the weapons natural to it, "steel and fire;" and, mad with judicial blindness, is rushing at now aroused FREEDOM. So let it perish.